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Progress Report on Louisiana's Trust
Estates Act
Harriet S. Daggett*
It must have been gratifying to "believers" that Louisiana
at long last and as late as 1938 wholeheartedly adopted a pure
common law express trust. It has been referred to as a "com-
prehensive trust code."' In the little more than ten years of its
existence, the act has attracted a minimum of attention from
courts or legislature, while reports of its increasing use in the
state continue. Indications point to its success as a legal device
for which there must have been a practical need. Due to the
youth of the statute, this brief statement must be concerned
more with the lack of the device in Louisiana and events con-
cerned with its initial appearance than with its development.
Due to lack of litigation, though perhaps a good sign, everything
that can or will be said here has been said and much better said,
elsewhere. Many critical comments including comparative stud-
ies were published at the initial appearance of Louisiana's statute.
Thus far, there is little to be added, without useless repetition.
The basic reason for the long absence of a trust device in
Louisiana, a civil law state, may lie in the old difference of belief
between founders of common law and civil law concerning the
best interests of the state, evidenced in the law of inheritance
and elsewhere. The underlying thought of the common law ad-
herents is said to have been that the state profited most by hold-
ing fortunes intact rather than in dividing them into parts, thus
preserving continuity of use and power and effecting greater
stability and productivity for society. The thought of the civil
law, on the contrary, was to emphasize individuality, thus en-
couraging widespread effort and, presumably, greater produc-
tivity. Furthering this idea, devices emerged for distributing
wealth among large numbers and for keeping property in cir-
culation rather than permitting it to be held in large units for
prolonged periods of time.2 Hence, France, an immediate legal
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Bogert, Cases on the Law of Trusts (2 ed. 1942) 17.
2. See Social Meaning of Legal Concepts: 1-Inheritance of Property and
the Power of Testamentary Disposition. New York University School of
Law, 1948.
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parent of Louisiana, moved to rid the state of substitutions
(entail) early in the days of the French Republic. Naturally,
the prohibition of the Code Napoleon 3 against substitutions
appeared and remains in the Civil Code of Louisiana, 4 as this
device for keeping property units intact is clearly counter to
the basic ideology of the civil law, illustrated by inheritance
doctrines of forced heirship, representation, collation, et cetera. 5
The legal parent of the modern trust device is said by one
group of historians to be the fidei commissa of the Roman law;
by another group, now apparently more favored, to be the salman
of early German law.6 However that may be, France with her
great Roman inheritance approved the fidei commissa and re-
tained it even in the days of upheaval, levelling, and discard of
devices inimical to individualism. 7 Louisiana, however, prohib-
ited it together with substitutions,8 a natural step in a new
country imbued with French revolutionary ideas and also anx-
ious to facilitate production, keep trade active, and hold to un-
complicated forms of ownership, notions which have continued
to the present day and are found throughout the law, including
that of mineral rights, recently developed.9 Naturally, there are
two schools of thought regarding the need for the trust in civil
law. The Lepaulleo view might be interpreted to mean that
civil law substitutes are adequate, while Dr. Alfaro is emphatic
that there is no substitute and that there is dire need for relief."
Mr. Patton states that Dr. Lepaulle shows by inference that
there is no adequate substitute.1 2 Certainly the actual move-
ment, regardless of theory, seems to be toward adoption of the
device in civil law states, fully demonstrating the practical atti-
tude in regard to the question.'3
3. Art. 896, French Civil Code.
4. Art. 1520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Daggett, General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law
(1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 399.
6. Bogert, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7.
7. Comment (1941) 3 LOUisINA LAW REVIgw 795.
8. Art. 1520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Daggett, Louisiana Mineral Rights (1 ed. 1939).
10. Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 1126.
11. Patton, Trust Systems in the Western Hemisphere (1945) 19 Tulane
L. Rev. 398.
1 12. Patton, Future of Trust Legislation in Latin America (1946) 20
Tulane L. Rev. 542, 552.
13. Vilella, The Problems of Trust Legislation in Civil Law Jurisdictions:
-The Law of Trusts in Puerto Rico (1945) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 374. See also
Wisdom, Progress in the Codification of Trusts (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 165.
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Louisiana has provided specifically since 188214 for trusts
for religious, educational, and literary purposes. Obviously, it
was possible before that time to arrange for charitable dispo-
sitions.1'- For example, a bit of color in which Louisiana abounds
flares from the foundation of a dower fund for indigent brides-
to-be.'6 Legend has it that the donor, the renowned Julien Poy-
dras, was frustrated in love and suffered throughout his lifetime
because the girl whom he wished to marry in his youth could
not produce a dowry. Later rumor suggests that at least one
alert and enterprising young groom has gained bride and dowry
settlement more than once. Despite the efforts of bankers and
others to have a trust act passed, the chief argument being that
money and business were going out of the state to found trusts
in New York and elsewhere, Louisiana did not weaken her major
position until 1920,17 when the first general trust act was passed.
In 1921, a new constitution was adopted, and in the same section
wherein the doctrine of forced heirship' was protected appeared
permission for creation of trust estates with limited terms. 19
The statute of 1920 was brief, incomplete, and short lived.
A member of the Supreme Court of Louisiana termed it sketchy.2
Further condemnation of the statute is expressed by Justice
Rogers in the following language:
"Although the effect of the adoption of Act 107 of 1920 was
to introduce the institution of private trusts to the people
of this State, the act itself was drafted without regard to
the principles governing such trusts under the common law
and without any attempt being made to correlate such trusts
with the background of the civil law. It seems the principal
object of the framers of the act was to enlarge the trust
business conducted by the banks by making it plain that the
creation of trusts was authorized for that purpose. The act
contains a number of provisions wholly favorable to banks
engaged in the trust business. Other than to authorize the
trustee to administer the trust property in conformity to the
directions contained in the instrument creating the trust,
14. La. Act 124 of 1882 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1296-1303]; Wheeler, The
Louisiana Law of Charities (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 177.
15. Ibid.
16. Note reference in La. Act 253 of 1855, § 1.
17. La. Act 107 of 1920; La. Act 167 of 1920 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9830-
)835].
18. Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in Texas
and Louisiana (1941) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 42.
19. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16.
20. Hagerty v. Clement, 195 La. 230, 196 So. 330 (1940), discussed in The
Work -of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term-Successions
(1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW RVIEW 267, 288, and Note (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 465.
[VOL. X
REPORT ON TRUST ESTATES ACT
and conferring upon the trustee, unless prohibited by the
terms of the trust instrument, the discretionary right to
alienate or encumber the trust property, no attempt is made
in the act to define or limit the duties or powers of the
trustee, the beneficiary, or the creator of the trust."'1
However, the statute served two useful purposes. It accomplished
first acquaintance, though brief and unsatisfactory, with the trust
idea. It contained a specific clause whereby the legitime
might be subjected to a trust and this provision was tested for
constitutionality by the Supreme Court of the State and upheld,
22
thus paving the way for the 1938 statute.
The act was repealed in 193523 with apparently no particu-
larly strenuous objections. The repealing act contained a special
provision whereby beneficiaries could demand "full accounting
and immediate delivery"24 of property. As to trusts already in
existence, the repealing statute was of course held to be uncon-
stitutional, and vested rights of trustees were protected. 2'5 The
matter of trusts then rested in Louisiana until 193826 when the
comprehensive and carefully worked out act presently available
was passed.
Mr. John Minor Wisdom of the New Orleans Bar in a most
interesting and scholarly article appearing in the Tulane Law
Review had this to say about the act:
"On the whole it [the 1938 act] is a skillful amalgam of the
Restatement, the Uniform Trusts Act, the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, the Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act and
Erwin P. Griswold's proposed Spendthrift Trust Law. '27
Professor Paul M. Hebert, Dean of the.Louisiana State Uni-
versity Law School, and his associate in reviewing 1938 legisla-
tion for the Louisiana Law Review made a similar statement:
"This new Louisiana Trust Act, while sanctioning trusts,
restricts their operation to conform with state constitutional
requirements and to adapt it to present Louisiana law. The
21. 195 La. 230, 239, 196 So. 330, 333.
22. Wilbert v. Wilbert, 155 La. 197, 99 So. 36 (1923); Succession of Man-
they, 159 La. 743, 106 So. 289 (1925). See also Buck v. Haas, 180 La. 188,
156 So. 217 (1934) and Hart v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co. of Hartford,
46 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. La., 1942).
23. La. Act 7 of 1935(3 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 9822.1; 9822.1111.
24. Id. at § 2.
25. Succession of Manning, 185 La. 894, 171 So. 68 (1936); Succession of
Forstner, 186 La. 577, 173 So. 111 (1937).
26. La. Act 81 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9850.1-9850.101].
27. Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on the Restatement
and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates Act (1938) 13 Tulane L.
Rev. 70, 87.
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1938 Trust' Act is primarily based upon the Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, the provisions of which have been kept
as nearly intact as possible. The Louisiana statute also
embodies provisions taken from the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, the proposed Uniform Trusts Act, and the pro-
posed Spendthrift Trust Act. The result is a comprehensive
piece of legislation which should facilitate the development
of trusts in Louisiana." 28
Mr. Frank P. Stubbs, trust officer, also writing for the Lou-
isiana Law Review showed even more enthusiasm. He said:
"With the enactment of Act 81 of 1938-better known as
the Trust Estates Act-the Legislature placed in the hands
of every Louisiana lawyer a tool which has always been a
respectable and useful part of the kit of his fellow craftsmen
in the forty-seven other states but which, for fairly well
known historical reasons, was prohibited in Louisiana for an
aggregate of one hundred and fourteen years. That tool is
the private trust device. '2
9
On the other hand, Professor Eugene Nabors of the Law Fac-
ulty of Tulane University in a scholarly article appearing in the
Tulane Law Review pointed out the imperfections and deficiencies
of the statute. His article is entitled "The Shortcomings of the
Louisiana Trust Estates Act and Some Problems of Drafting
Trust Instruments Thereunder.""0 The study is carefully and
critically developed to show the lack of scope of Louisiana's first
real effort as compared with the full stature of the trust device
as evolved in common law jurisdictions. This valuable treatise
should aid draftsmen of the future as the trust idea becomes
familiar to the people of the state and their use of it more general.
In a note on 1938 legislation appearing in the Harvard Law
Review, the author, after an enlightening comparative discussion,
concluded with the following statement:
"Perhaps the outstanding impression received from a cursory
perusal of the statute is that sensible changes have been
made in the common law; but there follows closely a revela-
tion of ambiguity of language and incompleteness of treat-
ment, much of which could easily have been remedied in
the drafting, but which, if the Act is successful in bringing
trusts to Louisiana, will take years of painful and costly
effort to clarify in the courts. Although it is inevitable that
interested groups will influence and perhaps distort sub-
28. (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 138.
29. Stubbs, Louisiana Trusts for the Louisiana Lawyer (1939) 1 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEw 774.
30. (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 178.
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stance, it does not follow that they must control form, for
they too would be benefited by certainty. It may be neither
possible nor desirable to provide in advance for every detail,
but it is not unreasonable to hope that an experienced corps
of draftsmen might draw upon centuries of litigious develop-
ment to obviate repetition of the difficulties. This eclectic
Act shows with peculiar force the weaknesses of the ad hoc
method of drafting by interested parties."3' 1
Proper efforts were made in the state to introduce the act
and make its possibilities familiar to a citizenry generally un-
acquainted with a device so long denied. In addition to law
review articles, trust departments issued neat, convenient, and
well indexed booklets containing the act. Mr. George Wallace,
recognized throughout the state for his thorough knowledge of
constitutional history and technique and as an expert drafts-
man upon whom the executive and legislative branches of the
state government have long relied, issued a volume of easy
reference dealing with the new trust act. After commenting upon
the sources, he made the following statement in regard to the
use and understanding of the act:
In the Restatement full explanations and illustrations are
given under every statement of a rule. These comments and
examples make the Restatement extremely valuable as
source material for the Trust Estates Act in that they supply
lawyers and judges with a reliable guide to understanding
and interpretation of the greater part of the Act. Where the
wording of a provision in the Trust Estates Act is copied
from or is substantially the same as the corresponding rule
in the Restatement one has only to refer to the Restatement
itself for an authoritative explanation. Moreover, where a
provision in the Trust Estates Act differs from the rule on
the same point in the Restatement and interpretation is de-
sired, the very fact of difference may be a helpful clue. '8 2
Despite suggestions for improvements from informed sources,
83
only one amendment to the original act has thus far appeared.
In 1944 the following deletion was made from Title 6 of the
article dealing with transfer of the interest of the beneficiary.
"The right of any beneficiary of a trust to receive the prin-
cipal of the trust or any part of it, presently or in the future,
shall be freely alienable and subject to the claims of his
31. (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 145, 151.
32. Wallace, The Trust Estates Act Handbook (1938) x.
33. In addition to articles previously referred to, see Martin, On the
Terminability of Trusts (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 585; Comment (1948) 22
Tulane L. Rev. 637, 639.
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creditors, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary
in the terms of the trust. '8 4
The initial attempt at such an undertaking could scarcely
hope to attain perfection. Particularly is that true when resist-
ance to the very idea was so deep rooted and long standing.
Mr. Vilella has specifically pointed out the many difficulties in
his article, the "Problems of Trust Legislation in Civil Law
Jurisdiction, '35 as have other authors writing on the subject, cited
in this resum6. One writer has said:
"To undertake the introduction of the mature institution of
trusts into the civil law of Louisiana is not only to face many
difficult problems of policy, but also to enter upon a task of
draftsmanship at once fascinating and delicate. '3 6
What might be termed practically a bitterness against common
law trusts appears in an opinion by Justice Land in 1935 where
he speaks of "too much 'squinting' at common law trusts"37 and
quotes from many decisions 'of the Louisiana Supreme Court
where the idea or any approach to it is emphatically negated.
Judge Dawkins of the federal court subsequently refers to Justice
Land's "rather forceful language used in discussing common law
trusts."38
In the face, then, of long tradition, strong feeling, and prob-
lems of constitutionality, particularly in regard to burdening the
legitime, many adjustments and compromises must have been
necessary to secure passage of the act.39 It is really remarkable
that the job was done so well and that the statute has thus far ap-
parently worked successfully. The act is short, considering its
distinct importance, occupying but thirty-two pages of an ordi-
nary sized statute book using desirably large print. The act
contains twelve titles and a total of one hundred and one sections.
The titles and subtitles or chapters appear as follows:
1. Definitions, Distinctions, and Restrictions
2. Creation of the Trust
Chapter 1-Methods for Creating
Chapter 2-Purposes for Which a Trust Can Be Created
3. Trust Property
4. Trustee
34. La. Act 290 of 1944, amending La. Act 81 of 1938, § 28 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 9850.28].
35. (1945) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 374.
36. Note (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 145, 151.
37. Buck v. Larcade, 183 La. 570, 576, 164 So. 593, 595 (1935).
38. Hart v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co. of Hartford, 46 F. Supp. 166,
168 (W.D. La., 1942).
39. See discussion of action of Bar Association, Baldwin, The Unauth-
orized Practice of Law (1944) 5 LOUISIANA LAW R vizw 599.
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5. Beneficiary
6. Transfer of the Interest of the Beneficiary
7. Administration of the Trust
Chapter 1-General Principles
Chapter 2-Duties of the Trustee
Chapter 3-Powers of the Trustee
Chapter 4-Remedies of the Beneficiary and Liabilities
of the Trustee
Chapter 5-Investment of Trust Funds
Chapter 6-Principal and Income-Ascertaining and Ac-
counting
Chapter 7-Compensation and Indemnity of the Trustee
8. Prescription of Actions by the Beneficiary Against the
Trustee
9. Recordation, Effect of
10. Termination and Modification of Trust
11. Procedure in Certain Cases
12. Miscellaneous
The text is clearly written and lacks the repetition, verboseness,
poor choice of words, bad sentence structure, and indeed, poor
English that are often unfortunately found in the ordinary legis-
lative enactment. Considering the sources and the draftsmen
connected therewith, this result is not surprising, but nonethe-
less Louisiana's draftsmen and legislators are also to be con-
gratulated that the fine source material was so intelligently
used.
The simplicity and flexibility 40 of the act within the pattern
is particularly desirable in a jurisdiction where neither the bar
nor the layman has great familiarity or experience with carry-
ing out the desires of clients who wish this type of security. For
example, in creating the trust "no particular form of words or
conduct shall be necessary for the manifestation of intention to
create a trust."'4' Again, the "maximum allowable period" is ten
years or in case of a minor, ten years from the majority of the
beneficiary. Should a longer period have been indicated by the
instrument, the trust is not invalidated for this cause but is
unenforceable beyond the legal term.42
The clause of the 1920 act,48 dealing with the burdening of
40. Suggestion for possible evolution. See Note (1942) 16 Tulane L. Rev.
299.
41. La. Act 81 of 1938, tit. 2, § 9 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.9). For ex-
amples of use of Act 81 of 1938, see Succession of Butterworth, 195 La. 115,
120, 196 So. 39, 40 (1940); United States v. Burglass, 172 F.(2d) 960 (C.C.A.
5th, 1949).
42. La. Act 81 of 1938, tit. 1, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.4].
43. La. Act 107 of 1920.
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the revered "forced share," which stood the test of constitution-
ality," appeared as follows:
"Be it further-enacted, etc., That the provisions contained in
the Revised Civil Code, and the laws of this State relative to
substitutions, Fidei Commissa, or trust dispositions, and the
legitime shall not be deemed to apply to, or in any manner
affect donations of the character and made in the manner
provided by this Act; and all laws or parts of laws con-
flicting with the provisions of this Act are repealed insofar
as regards the purposes of this Act, but not otherwise. '45
The clause of the new act dealing with this delicate matter
states that:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the law
in regard to forced heirship, save that it shall be permissible
under this Act for a settlor to create a trust upon the legi-
time or any portion thereof of his forced heir. The legitime
or any portion thereof in trust shall be fully subject to the
applicable provisions of this Act, provided that the income
therefrom may not be accumulated but shall be paid not less
than once a year to the person entitled thereto, notwith-
standing any provision to the contrary in the terms of the
trust."
46
Favorable decisions under the first act need not be followed
under the second. Moreover, in 194447 the section of the consti-
tution containing permission for trusts and protection for the
doctrine of forced heirship was amended to protect adopted
persons, and while there was no change in the language dealing
with the two matters under consideration, the arrangement of
the sentences was changed by insertion of the new material and
doubt has again been expressed regarding constitutionality of
the trust insofar as burdening the legitime is concerned.4 8
Care was taken to save the rest of the act in case the court
found a portion invalid. The divisibility clause found in the last
section of the act appears as follows:
"If any part of this Act shall be found to be unconstitutional
the other parts thereof shall not be affected provided such
invalid or unconstitutional part or -parts may be separable
from the valid or constitutional part or parts. The Legisla-
ture hereby declares that it would have passed this Act, and
44. See cases cited note 22, supra.
45. La. Act 107 of 1920, § 8.
46. La. Act 81 of 1938, tit. 1, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.31.
47. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16.
48. O'Quin, Our Trust Estates and their Limitations (1948) 22 Tulane
L. Rev. 585.
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such part thereof, irrespective of the fact that some parts
might be declared unconstitutional."
Louisiana has always honored the usufruct, a civil law "sub-
stitute." Donations of usufruct are frequent. Several legal usu-
fructs are provided.4 9 The device is in constant use under
Article 916 of the Civil Code which deliberately places the bur-
den upon the share of the children of the marriage, forced heirs,
in favor of the surviving spouse in intestate successions, as to
the deceased spouse's half of the community property. The
supreme court may be said to have actually extended this doc-
trine.50 A sympathetic carry-over of this attitude to the trust
act is not too much to expect. Furthermore, since a favorable
view was taken to the legitime provision of the trust act of 1920
and mere rearrangement of constitutional clauses has subse-
quently occurred, it would appear that no grave danger now
exists, barring a catastrophe which would unduly influence the
court and the people of the state.
49. Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (reprint,
1945) 275 et seq.
50. Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
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